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Keeping It Private 
MAIMON SCHWARZSCHILD* 
Public law adjudication has grown dramatically in recent decades in 
many English-speaking countries.  In the United States, intensely controversial 
questions of public policy—on race relations, abortion, sexuality, the 
place of religion in public life, and much else—have been tried as 
constitutional questions and decided by court order.  In other English-
speaking countries, where it was rare until recently for public questions 
to be decided in court, judges are increasingly making public law—influenced 
perhaps by America, and encouraged by the adoption of international 
treaties, especially on human rights, whose provisions are often general 
and leave much, if not virtually everything, open to interpretation.1
In other areas of law, by contrast—in everyday tort, contract, and property 
cases—court decisions are typically much less dramatic and seldom, if 
ever, announce controversial innovations in public policy.  Yet in these 
cases, too, there lurk implicit questions of social justice.  What force, if 
any, should existing social baselines and expectations have?  What account 
should a court take of whether a litigant is rich or poor, manager or worker, 
corporation or individual, landlord or tenant?  Is freedom of contract just 
or unjust?  Does justice not require promoting equality?  And if so, how 
and in what sense? 
In common law countries, perhaps not surprisingly, tort, contract, and 
other private law cases are often decided on common law principles—
 * Professor of Law, University of San Diego.  Affiliated Professor, University of 
Haifa.  This Article appears in somewhat different form in Symposium, The Role of 
Policy in Private Law Adjudication, 25 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 215 (2006). 
 1. See, e.g., European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (substantially incorporated as 
domestic law in the United Kingdom, Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.)). 




principles developed by courts incrementally over time rather than laid 
down by statute.  Common law has a style and ethos of its own.2  It is 
based on precedent and, although precedent is open to modification, the 
common law style is anything but impetuous.  With roots in the nineteenth 
century and earlier, common law often reflects classically liberal ideas, 
more or less consciously and more or less robustly. 
Instead of approaching private law cases with a common law mindset, 
should judges not treat these cases the way they might treat public law 
cases?  Should courts not promote a vision of justice and human rights 
through private law adjudication, just as they might do—or might wish 
to do—in notable public law decisions, whether or not the vision might 
be controversial and whether or not it might mark a break with common 
law tradition? 
This Article suggests several reasons why they should not.  Turning 
private law more public in such a way would have considerable costs in 
legal stability, transparency, legitimacy, and in judicial habits of neutrality 
and impartiality.  Each of these considerations, in turn, is associated with 
what is generally thought of as the Rule of Law.  The classically liberal 
ideas in the common law bloodstream themselves have at least some 
association with political freedom and the Rule of Law, as well as with 
economic prosperity.  And even if one is sceptical about classical liberalism, 
one might reflect that, to the extent that there is public acceptance of 
ambitious public law adjudication, it might depend at least in part on the 
credit that courts build up through morally and politically unambitious 
day-to-day common law adjudication. 
I. 
There is a sharp distinction between public and private law in continental 
civil law, and in the legal systems around the world more or less modeled 
on the Napoleonic codification—or misapprehension—of Roman law.3  
In civil law countries, public and private law are typically adjudicated in 
separate court systems, under separate legal codes; public and private 
law are taught as separate subjects to law students, and the distinction is 
a basic piece of mental furniture for civil lawyers.  In English-speaking 
common law countries, by contrast, the distinction between public and 
 2. See generally David Sugarman, Legal Theory, the Common Law Mind and the 
Making of the Textbook Tradition, in LEGAL THEORY AND COMMON LAW 26 (William 
Twining ed., 1986) (examining the history of teaching common law, and why common 
law predominates today in legal education). 
 3. See Peter G. Stein, Roman Law, Common Law, and Civil Law, 66 TUL. L. REV. 
1591, 1595 (1992) (reflecting on the civil law distinction between public and private law, 
and the uncertain links between Roman law and Napoleonic civil law). 
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private law, and even the terms, are alien and seldom used by lawmakers, 
judges, or practising lawyers.  Legal academics in common law countries 
sometimes take up the idea, but with an awareness—gratifying or 
otherwise—that it has a foreign flavor. 
Private law in a civil law country means the law governing individuals 
and private organizations and their relations with each other, as opposed 
to the public law governing the government and its relations to its 
citizens.  In a common law country, private law would translate, more or 
less, to the law of tort, contract, property, inheritance, as well as many 
aspects of family and commercial law. 
In common law countries, private law has mostly been a matter of 
common law, and to a considerable extent it still is.  This is not quite the 
truism, or the tautology, that it sounds.  Most English-speaking countries 
are common law countries, in the sense that their legal systems are 
derived from England, home of the common law.  But not all law in a 
common law country is common law.  In England itself, law and equity 
have long coexisted.  And common law more narrowly means non-
statutory, judge-made law, developed in case decisions which follow or 
modify the precedents of earlier decisions.  Statutory law is not common 
law in this sense, although common law countries certainly have statutes, 
enacted at an accelerating clip in the last century.4  Actually, the distinction 
between statutory law and common law is clouded by the fact that 
statutes in a common law country—and for that matter constitutions, 
regulations, and other legal instruments—are interpreted and applied by 
judges with a common law training and cast of mind, thus, in something 
of a common law style.  How strictly or freely common law judges 
interpret statutes may vary from time to time and place to place.  English 
courts in the twentieth century read statutes very literally, whereas 
American courts had a freer, more common law style, which is to say 
they exercised more lawmaking power even in statutory cases.5  Still, in 
 4. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 2 (1982) 
(arguing that courts should have more power to update today’s plethora of statutes); 
GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 95 (1977) (noting a twentieth-century 
“orgy of statute making”). 
 5. P. S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-
AMERICAN LAW 96, 100–01 (1987).  See also Maimon Schwarzschild, Class, National 
Character, and the Bar Reforms in Britain: Will There Always Be an England?, 9 CONN. 
J. INT’L L. 185, 206–12 (1994) (arguing that the unrepresentative upper-class character of 
the English Bar and judiciary impelled twentieth-century English judges to interpret 




principle, statutes are not common law; and in practice, even if judges 
have some freedom to interpret statutes, they have less freedom to make 
law in cases controlled by statutes than in cases where there is no statute.  
Hence the distinction between common law and statutory law, even in 
common law countries—or rather, only in common law countries, since 
under civil law there is, at least in principle, nothing but statutory law. 
For many centuries in England, and well into the twentieth century 
there and in other English-speaking jurisdictions, the law of tort and 
contract—the heart of private law—was mostly judge-made common 
law, with statutes few and far between.  Even today, much of the law of 
tort is common law, and although contract law in the United States is 
substantially governed by the Uniform Commercial Code, the UCC itself 
is largely a codification or restatement of common law doctrines and 
rules.6
This has had significant policy implications for private law in common 
law countries.  Common law rules and precedents are not random in 
their public policy tilt.  Common law is strongly associated with liberal 
ideas.  Among these ideas are: 
- Private autonomy; 
- Private property; 
- Neutrality or abstraction of legal rules: equality before the law; 
- Legal stability and predictability. 
Private autonomy and private property are implicit to some extent in 
any contract law, but common law contract doctrines particularly lean 
toward freedom of contract and enforcing the expressed will of the 
parties—a practical way of respecting autonomy.  Tort responsibility 
also implies at least a degree of moral responsibility and autonomy.  
Moreover, common law tends toward general or abstract rules which do 
not respect persons; contract law does not typically ask, “What kind of 
commodity is the contract about?,” or “Who are the parties?”  Nor does 
the outcome of a common law tort case typically depend on who is the 
tortfeasor or what kind of person is the victim.  Finally, common law 
puts a premium on stability and predictability; these are implicit in the 
notion of precedent, which is fundamental to common law. 
Hence the close link between common law and classical liberalism.  
Individual autonomy, of course, is the core idea of liberalism7.  Private 
statutes literally rather than to risk public revolt by being seen to make policy through a 
broader style of interpretation). 
 6. Edward L. Rubin, The Code, the Consumer, and the Institutional Structure of 
the Common Law, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 11, 18 n.22 (1997). 
 7. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., 
2003). 
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property and voluntary exchange, at least in some measure, are practical 
prerequisites to individual autonomy.  They ensure a degree of moral 
independence from other people; they are also an indispensable counterweight 
to government power and the force of social conformity.  In the nature of 
private property, some people will have more of it than others; but in a 
society without property rights, there would be little or no climate of individual 
autonomy at all.8  Neutral rules and equality before the law—rather than 
equality of condition or of outcome—are likewise associated with classical 
liberalism.  Legal stability and predictability mean that the citizen can 
know what the law requires, without which autonomy would be difficult 
or impossible. 
The common law’s liberal ethos should hardly be surprising.  Common 
law as we know it came into its own in the eighteenth and especially 
nineteenth century, the heyday of laissez-faire liberalism.  In the twentieth 
century—the age of statutes—by contrast, a variety of doctrines and 
political forces challenged free market liberalism and denigrated it as 
retrograde, sometimes with great political success. 
The liberal values of the common law, like liberal ideas themselves, 
continue to be controversial.  Private property and free markets are 
controversial; certainly the degree to which they should be regulated is 
controversial.  Equality before the law is easily mocked: “[T]he majestic 
equality of the laws, which forbid rich and poor alike to sleep under the 
bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal their bread.”9  So likewise for 
legal stability and predictability: 
It is a Maxim among these lawyers that whatever hath been done before may 
legally be done again: And therefore they take special Care to record all the 
Decisions formerly made against common Justice and the general Reason of 
Mankind.  These, under the Name of Precedents, they produce as Authorities to 
justify the most iniquitous Opinions; and the Judges never fail of decreeing 
accordingly.10
Still, although controversial, the common law values are closely associated 
with what people—not only in common law countries, but around the 
world—call the Rule of Law.  In fact, whatever else people may mean 
by the Rule of Law, at a minimum they usually mean respect for the 
 8. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944) (providing a classic 
twentieth-century restatement of this view). 
 9. ANATOLE FRANCE, THE RED LILY 75 (Modern Library 1917) (1894). 
 10. JONATHAN SWIFT, GULLIVER’S TRAVELS 217 (Oxford Univ. Press 1986) 
(1735). 




autonomy of the individual; property rights; neutral principles and equality 
before the law; and predictability and fair notice about what the law 
requires.11
II. 
A standard academic objection to private law in the English-speaking 
world, especially private common law, is that it fails to give enough 
place to public policy.  Of course, all law, and every legal decision, reflects 
and promotes a policy of some kind.  And common law precedents are 
not randomly scattered from a policy point of view.  Common law was 
traditionally predisposed to the classically liberal policies of individual 
autonomy, private property, free exchange, and so forth.  Common law 
has evolved over the years, to be sure, and precedents have been 
modified; that is what is meant by the common law process.  Thus, 
classic laissez-faire policy has been softened: unconscionable contracts 
are not enforced,12 contracts of adhesion are sometimes not enforced,13 
and privity is no longer required for a products liability action.14  More 
radically, causation and other standard elements of a tort suit are 
sometimes—justly or otherwise—elided or ignored in mass tort cases 
and other class actions.15  Still, private common law adjudication on the 
whole reflects and promotes a bundle of public policies which might be 
described as modified liberalism, or a spirit of welfare capitalism. 
In principle, a public policy objection to private law could be made 
from the political right, along the lines that there ought to be a stronger 
or more consistent commitment to economic freedom, or to wealth-
maximizing efficiency, as guiding legal principles.  A very few academic 
critics do propose this sort of view.16
 11. See generally Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, FOREIGN AFF., 
Mar.–Apr. 1998, at 95 (discussing the Rule of Law and reform initiatives in various 
countries to strengthen it). 
 12. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 
1965) (holding unconscionable contracts unenforceable at common law).  For a wry 
assessment of the unconscionability clause in the Uniform Commercial Code, see Arthur 
Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. 
REV. 485 (1967). 
 13. See Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in 
Contract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 769–71 (2002). 
 14. See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). 
 15. Mark Moller, The Rule of Law Problem: Unconstitutional Class Actions and 
Options for Reform, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 855, 859–63 (2005) (arguing that it 
may violate due process to relax or ignore the causation requirement, and other elements 
of a conventional tort case, in class actions). 
 16. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF TORT LAW (1987). 
SCHWARZSCHILD.DOC 11/9/2007  9:31:14 AM 
[VOL. 44:  677, 2007]  Keeping It Private 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 683 
 
But overwhelmingly, the public policy objection comes from the 
political left.  The trouble with private law, so the objection goes, is that 
it fails to promote redistribution and egalitarianism and other goals of 
the political left.17  It takes for granted and fails to transform existing 
baselines of possession and power in society.18  What private law ought 
to do is to strengthen plaintiffs as against corporate defendants, labor 
unions as against management, the poor as against the rich, and minority 
groups as against the majority, either by general rules likely to foster 
these outcomes, or explicitly by taking into account who the parties are 
to a given case and bending the rulings accordingly.  It is no surprise that 
the “public policy” criticism of private law tends to be along these lines, 
given the classical liberal policies that are in the common law bloodstream, 
and given that legal academia is heavily tilted to the political left.19
At one level, the objection is a curious one.  After all, private law can 
certainly be changed in the name of left-leaning public policy, and it  
frequently has been by legislation.  Statutory enactments have created entire 
new areas of law, greatly modifying what had been private common law.  
For example, landlord-tenant law and consumer protection law are more 
favorable to tenants and consumers respectively than the common law of 
property and contract would have been.  Civil rights laws which extend 
to private employment and housing are yet another example, prohibiting 
 17. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, An Overview of Feminist Torts Scholarship, 78 
CORNELL L. REV. 575 (1993) (offering enthusiastic and uncritical citations to many 
articles and books urging change in tort law along feminist lines); Duncan Kennedy, 
Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference 
to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 638 (1982) 
(urging “ad hoc paternalism” by judges in tort and contract cases); Anthony T. Kronman, 
Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472 (1980) (urging that rules of 
contract law should be used to achieve egalitarian redistributionist goals); Chris William 
Sanchirico, Taxes Versus Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View, 
29 J. LEGAL STUD. 797 (2000) (urging that egalitarian redistribution should be promoted 
by common law rules as well as by tax laws). 
 18. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 875 (1987) 
(criticizing common law rules that perpetuate inegalitarian social “baselines”). 
 19. John O. McGinnis, Matthew A. Schwartz & Benjamin Tisdell, The Patterns 
and Implications of Political Contributions by Elite Law School Faculty, 93 GEO. L.J. 
1167 (2005) (providing an empirical study of the leftward tilt of U.S. law professors).  
See also Peter H. Schuck, Leftward Leaning, AM. LAW., Dec. 1, 2005, at 77, 77 
(“[R]ecent studies reveal what the insiders have known all along: Professors at top U.S. 
law schools are predominantly liberal . . . .”). 




private discrimination which would mostly have been lawful at common 
law.20
Other areas of statutory law present a more mixed picture in terms of 
their political and ideological leanings.  Labor law as enacted in the United 
States in the 1930s gave workers and labor unions rights and protections 
that they did not have under common law.21  But new federal laws in the 
late 1940s and 1950s were tougher on labor unions, forbidding secondary 
boycotts, providing for federal oversight of union elections, permitting 
states to enact right-to-work laws, and so forth.22  These statutes were 
still much more favorable to unions than the traditional common law, but 
less favorable than the first wave of New Deal legislation.  Family law is 
another area of partly private law whose ideological leanings vary over 
time.  Divorce has steadily been liberalized in recent decades—whether 
to the advantage of women might be debatable—but along lines generally 
thought to be emancipatory.  Alimony, support, and community property 
laws vary from state to state.  Women’s groups and men’s groups alike 
sometimes protest that they are ill used by these laws, which is no guarantee, 
of course, that the laws have achieved a golden mean.  Gay marriage has 
been enacted by several countries around the world and judicially decreed 
in Massachusetts; gay civil union or domestic partnership statutes have 
been adopted in a few American states.  But many American states have 
enacted laws rejecting gay marriage, and the federal Defense of Marriage 
Act explicitly authorizes states to refuse to recognize it.23
Commercial law is yet another area where the statutes lean now one 
way, now another.  To some extent, commercial law is the common law 
of contract.  But a lot of corporate law, with its fiduciary dimension, has 
roots in equity rather than law, and is mostly statutory.24  The tilt of 
corporate law, whether towards shareholders, managers, directors, consumers, 
or others, varies somewhat from state to state and from time to time.  
What the tilt actually is can itself sometimes be debatable.  There is some 
academic dispute, for example, whether the state of Delaware attracts 
 20. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2000) 
(prohibiting employment discrimination); Civil Rights (Fair Housing) Act of 1968, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2000) (prohibiting housing discrimination). 
 21. See, e.g., National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 
449 (1935). 
 22. See, e.g., Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-
101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947); Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-
Griffin) Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519. 
 23. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-99, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified 
as amended at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000)). 
 24. See Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 104 (1945) (“[R]ights at law were 
usually declared by State courts . . . while rights in equity were frequently defined by 
legislative enactment . . . .”). 
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firms because its laws favor managers and directors, or whether the laws 
do not particularly do so but merely have the virtue of being more clear 
and certain than those of other states.25
The ebb and flow of legislation, in short, tends to follow the election 
returns.  Within constitutional limits, this is democracy, and generally 
accepted. 
What is more controversial, and implicitly raised by the question of 
public policy in private law is whether judge-made common law should 
be more self-consciously guided by ideas about public policy.  Or, in 
what might amount to much the same thing, whether the legislature should 
enact vague, general statutes in private law areas whose interpretation 
might encourage courts to decide tort, contract, or property cases with 
more of an eye toward public policy.  Since common law has always had 
a policy tilt—mostly, and still, a modified liberal tilt—the question is 
really whether common law judges should shake off their common law 
policies and decide private law cases in accord with different policies, 
perhaps more in the way they might decide constitutional or other public 
law cases.  In short, should private law, especially common law, be more 
public? 
III. 
It seems to me that there are several reasons why this would not be a 
good idea: why we should keep it private. 
A.  Stability 
Turning private law more public would tend to undermine legal 
stability and predictability in two ways.  First, ideas about public policy 
change with the political and cultural currents—sometimes gradually, 
sometimes abruptly with the shifts of fashion.  During the course of the 
twentieth century, to take a long-term example, free market or laissez-
faire ideas were largely ascendant in the early decades of the century, 
social democratic ideas at mid-century, and there was a resurgence of 
free market thinking towards the end of the century.  Common law 
adjudication reflected these currents, but perhaps in a paler or less robust 
 25. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491 (2005) (reviewing 
debates about Delaware company law, and assessing the politics of state and federal 
corporate regulation). 
SCHWARZSCHILD.DOC 11/9/2007  9:31:14 AM 
 
686 
way than it might have done, inasmuch as it was restrained by common 
law precedent and the common law mindset.  To say that private law 
should be more public is to say that it should dissolve or at least loosen those 
restraints.  But that would mean less continuity, stability, and predictability 
in private law. 
Moreover, it is not just that public policy ideas change over time.  
They are also contested, more or less intensely, at any given time.  There 
were powerful socialist and social democratic counterforces in the early 
twentieth century, economic liberalism did not disappear at midcentury, 
and today’s world is not precisely a nirvana of non-contention.  If courts 
are to decide private law more in accordance with public policy, which 
public policy would apply?  It would vary, perhaps to some extent by 
geography since different policy ideas tend to be ascendant in different 
regions of a given country.  But inevitably it would vary with the individual 
judge, which is no recipe for stability.   
Of course, legal stability and predictability are not virtues that are supreme 
over all others.  Change is sometimes good.  Common law has always made 
room for change by modifying, distinguishing, or reversing precedents, 
and by a variety of other techniques and tropes familiar to lawyers and 
law students.  But predictability ranks fairly high among the legal virtues.  It 
is part of what people mean by the Rule of Law.  When the law is uncertain, 
human autonomy itself suffers, since without knowing what is permitted 
and what is forbidden it is less safe to act at all.  Common law lends an 
element of stability to private law, without being hopelessly—or perhaps 
even sufficiently—rigid.  More “public policy” would mean more variability, 
less stability, and less certainty about the law. 
B.  Transparency 
More public policy through adjudication, rather than through legislation, 
would mean less transparency in policy making.  The barriers would be 
higher to public knowledge about how, why, and even when and whether 
policy decisions were made.  Judicial policymaking is apt to be obscure 
to the public in various ways.  Adjudication is particular to its facts, at 
least in the first instance; it is technical, and understanding it often 
requires professional sophistication.  An occasional Supreme Court 
decision attracts broad publicity, but most court cases do not and cannot.  
Of course, legislation, too, can be mysterious.  It is a staple of political 
science and of daily journalism how legislatures sometimes hide what 
they are up to.  But making policy by legislation is surely more transparent 
than doing it by adjudication.  It is easier for the press and the public to 
follow legislative debates and decisions than judicial action.  There are 
fewer legislatures to watch than courts and judges—just one legislature 
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for each jurisdiction or sub-jurisdiction, instead of numerous courts and 
courtrooms.  Legislative policymaking is not cloaked in as much technicality 
and professional obscurity as the law.  One can be a legislator, after all, 
but not a lawyer, without a professional degree.  Legislative sessions and 
hearings can even be broadcast, while courts usually ban television 
cameras and radio microphones. 
At least one advocate of redistribution through private law is forthright, or 
ingenuous, enough to cite lack of transparency as a virtue for leftish policy 
making through private adjudication: 
In fact, it may at times be less obvious that legal rules are aiming at redistribution at 
all.  Progressive taxation and transfer payments are extremely transparent methods 
of transferring income from the wealthy to the poor.  In contrast, redistributive 
legal rules may have various aims and can be rationalized in different ways.  
For this reason as well, they are not in direct tension with prevailing 
individualistic beliefs.26
Stealth policymaking is antithetical to the Rule of Law, however, in 
various ways.  Transparency and public accountability are often thought 
essential, in and of themselves, to the Rule of Law.  There are also 
consequential implications.  Stealth may make it easier to ignore the 
public’s retrograde individualistic beliefs, for example, but it may also 
facilitate outright corruption.  Special interests have been known to want 
to influence public policy, and if courts are untethered to make such 
policy out of the public eye, it is imaginable that influence might be 
brought to bear, even that favors or cash might change hands.  Moreover, 
the public can no doubt be imposed upon for a time, but sooner or later it 
will be realized that public policy is being made—and “rationalized in 
different ways”—on an ambitious scale, cloaked from public scrutiny.  
The risk is considerable that public faith in the courts will be corroded or 
lost, and once lost, not easily restored. 
C.  Legitimacy 
The problem of judges as lawmakers in a democratic society is a familiar 
one.  Judges are not readily answerable to the electorate.  Hence, judicial 
lawmaking is in tension with democratic legitimacy, if not at odds with 
it.  Judicial review of legislation—the power of courts to strike down statutory 
laws as unconstitutional—is the best known aspect of the problem. 
 26. Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, In Defense of Redistribution Through Private Law, 
91 MINN. L. REV. 326, 369 (2006) (citation omitted). 




In a sense, it might seem less of a problem for unelected judges to 
shake off common law constraints and make private law in accordance 
with public policy—at least in the absence of contrary statutes—than 
striking down laws duly enacted by the people’s elected representatives 
through judicial review.  If a statute is struck down as unconstitutional, it 
cannot be reenacted, in principle, short of a constitutional amendment.27  
A judicial innovation in private law, by contrast, can presumably be 
modified or reversed by statute, in other words by simple majority.  Of 
course, enacting legislation is not really so simple, but the private law 
innovation still seems less at odds with democratic self-government, 
hence less a problem of legitimacy, than striking down statutes as 
unconstitutional.  But in another sense, it might seem even more problematic.  
After all, most citizens support and believe in their country’s constitution.  
If a law really does conflict with the constitution, it is plausible to think 
that the court is carrying out the popular will by striking it down.  But 
there is far less reason to think there is broad public support, or even 
majority support, for any particular policy idea about private law.  On 
the contrary, if judges have to introduce the policy, it can only be because 
the elected legislature has not done so. 
Still, if common law is legitimate—and common law is judge-made 
law by definition—why should a more public style of judge-made private 
law, more in tune with public policy ideas, be any less legitimate? 
It is partly a question of degree, and of public expectations.  Common 
law has been part of the American institutional landscape since the 
beginning.  Thus, there has been plenty of time and opportunity to jettison it 
if the voting public had wished to do so.  At least, common law is familiar 
enough not to frustrate public expectations in any acute way. 
Moreover, common law rules—both traditional principles and modifications 
arrived at through the common law process—tend not to be sharply 
controversial, or at least not to be the points on which society is most 
divided politically.  Contributory negligence or comparative negligence, 
privity or not as a requirement of products’ liability, the standard of care 
owed to a trespasser or to an invitee: people, if confronted with these 
questions, might disagree about them, but these are not (and never have 
been) the burning questions of the age.  And there is general acceptance 
that they are legal questions, properly settled by courts in accordance 
 27. In practice, new Supreme Court Justices, or a change of heart by sitting 
Justices, can render what was unconstitutional yesterday constitutional today, and vice 
versa.  See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (declaring anti-sodomy statutes 
unconstitutional and reversing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)); West Coast 
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding minimum wage laws, overruling 
Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923), and implicitly reversing the laissez-
faire doctrine of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)). 
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with common law principles and methods that may be understood dimly 
by the public but which have the sanction of time and long usage. 
The questions of public policy to which a more publicly-minded private 
law would presumably attend are, by contrast, intensely controversial 
even if academics are sometimes nearly unanimous about them.28  
Questions of distribution and redistribution, of regulation and freedom, 
of labor and capital, of the claims of minorities and majorities: these are 
the great political issues about which the public is divided.  It is not clear 
that judges have any special expertise about them.  No doubt the common 
law “baseline” takes an implicit view about some of these issues, a 
modified liberal view, on the whole.  But if established social baselines 
are to be changed, surely it should be by democratic decision, not by 
judicial fiat.  For judges to introduce new and contested policies about 
these questions, on an ambitious scale beyond the bounds—themselves 
elastic enough—of what might generally be accepted as common law 
decisionmaking, would certainly raise serious questions of democratic 
legitimacy. 
D.  Habits of Neutrality 
Neutrality and impartiality are ideals with deep roots in the idea of 
justice.  Aristotle says, “[I]t is evident that in seeking for justice men 
seek for the mean or neutral.”29  And Leviticus commands: “[T]hou shalt 
not respect the person of the poor, nor honour the person of the mighty: 
but in righteousness shalt thou judge thy neighbour.”30  Of course, impartiality 
is notoriously difficult to define.  If justice is treating likes alike, the 
question remains: what, and who, is relevantly alike? 
At a minimum, impartiality surely means that adjudication should not 
be driven by corruption—a litigant is not relevantly different from an 
opponent by virtue of having bribed the judge.  It is only a slightly more 
subtle form of corruption for judges to favor litigants of their own faction or 
political party.  Even sympathy can be a kind of corruption, especially 
since there is no assurance that sympathy will always gravitate toward 
those who most deserve it.  Knowing the ethical temperament of the 
Bible, one might have expected the Bible to urge judges to put a thumb 
 28. See supra note 19 (on legal academia’s leftward tilt). 
 29. ARISTOTLE, Politics, Bk. III, ch. 16, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1202 
(Richard McKeon ed., 1941). 
 30. Leviticus 19:15 (King James). 




on the scale in favor of the poor.  Instead, Leviticus categorically forbids 
favoritism towards the poor or the rich. 
Under common law, most private law rules and principles are, at least, 
general and abstract.  Common law tort and contract cases do not typically 
turn on who the litigants are, what business they are in, what commodity 
they are disputing over, or what interests or factions they might represent.  
This is the sense in which common law does not respect persons.  The 
law is meant to be impartial as between rich and poor, as between 
Republicans and Democrats, and as among a wide range of transactions 
and transactors.  This is the meaning, or at least one crucial meaning, of 
the inscription chiseled over the portico of the United States Supreme 
Court Building: Equal Justice Under Law.  And, hence, George Orwell’s 
backhanded tribute to English law: 
    Here one comes upon an all-important English trait: the respect for 
constitutionalism and legality, the belief in “the law” as something above the 
State and above the individual, something which is cruel and stupid, of course, 
but at any rate incorruptible. 
    It is not that anyone imagines the law to be just.  Everyone knows that there is 
one law for the rich and another for the poor.  But no one accepts the 
implications of this, everyone takes it for granted that the law, such as it is, will 
be respected, and feels a sense of outrage when it is not. . . .  Everyone believes in his 
heart that the law can be, ought to be, and, on the whole, will be impartially 
administered.  The totalitarian idea that there is no such thing as law, there is only 
power, has never taken root.  Even the intelligentsia have only accepted it in theory.31
Common law judges adjudicating private law disputes, therefore, develop, 
or have cause to develop, habits of impartiality and neutrality.  The 
common law style of private law fosters judicial values that sit well with 
Aristotle’s and Leviticus’s idea of justice, and with a widely held view 
of the Rule of Law. 
Public law, inevitably, is different.  When a legislature enacts public 
policy—beyond forbidding force and fraud—it is not neutral.  Deciding 
what and whom to tax, and how much; what and on whom to spend; 
whether and how to regulate commerce; whether to expand or restrict 
foreign trade; whether to build a highway here or there—public enactments 
usually if not invariably favor one interest or faction over another.  This 
is politics, and in democratic countries this is why legislation is a political 
process. 
 31. GEORGE ORWELL, The Lion and the Unicorn: Socialism and the English 
Genius, in 2 COLLECTED ESSAYS, JOURNALISM, AND LETTERS OF GEORGE ORWELL 56, 62–
63 (Sonia Orwell & Ian Angus eds., 1968).  Orwell goes on to say: 
The hanging judge, that evil old man in scarlet robe and horse-hair wig, whom 
nothing short of dynamite will ever teach what century he is living in, but who 
will at any rate interpret the law according to the books and will in no 
circumstances take a money bribe, is one of the symbolic figures of England. 
Id. at 63. 
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When courts make public policy, they too are not neutral.  In the 
United States, courts make policy through constitutional adjudication, 
through interpreting public statutes that are more or less vague, and through 
public law litigation of various kinds.  Whether adjudicating divisive 
questions such as racial policy, prisoners’ rights, abortion, gay marriage, 
or disputes over the place of religion in public life, the judge chooses 
sides, and advances some values and interests at the expense of others. 
There has always been a certain amount of public law adjudication; 
and in the past half century, especially in the United States, there has 
been more than there used to be.  One danger is judges might not merely 
choose sides on various public issues, but come to see themselves—and 
to be seen—as political partisans, with a natural bent toward helping the 
cause and its friends, whatever the cause might be, and frustrating the 
opposing cause and its friends.  Professor Larry Solum warns of a downward 
spiral of politicization,32 leading ultimately to judges deciding even routine 
nonpolitical tort or contract cases on the basis of whether a litigant is 
friend or foe, Democrat or Republican, One of Us or Not One of Us.  This is 
not far from how courts behave, or are widely believed to behave, in 
many countries around the world. 
In common law countries, however, there is a countervailing influence 
on judges’ behavior and character.  Day-to-day adjudication of private law 
cases, in accordance with common law principles that do not respect 
persons, fosters habits of neutrality and impartiality.  No doubt this neutrality 
is not perfect.  Common law is not neutral toward tortfeasors or toward 
parties who unjustifiably fail to perform their contracts.  But the private 
law style of adjudication is appreciably more impartial than public law 
adjudication, which overtly promotes controversial public policies 
favoring the interests and values of some at the expense of others. 
Courts and judges in common law countries have a centuries’ old 
reputation for impartiality and independence, one that is virtually unique 
in the world.33  The common law style of private law is at least one 
source of that reputation.  There is reason to believe or to hope that common 
 32. Lawrence B. Solum, Judicial Selection: Ideology Versus Character, 26 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 659, 661 (2005); see also A Neoformalist Manifesto, Legal Theory Blog, http://lsolum. 
typepad.com/legaltheory/2003/05/a_neoformalist_.html (May 18, 2003, 17:00 CST). 
 33. See, e.g., Michael Wallace Gordon, Forum Non Conveniens Misconstrued: A 
Response to Henry Saint Dahl, 38 U. OF MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 141, 146 n.22 (2006) 
(stating that foreign litigants are “choosing English courts because of their reputation for 
fairness” and that Latin American litigants are flocking to United States courts for the 
same reason, as well as in hopes of windfall judgments). 




law judges’ habits of impartiality and independence carry over even into 
their adjudication of overtly public law cases. 
To make private law more public, to shake off the common law style 
in favor of a more political style of adjudication, would dilute if not 
dissolve the common law influences fostering habits of judicial neutrality 
and impartiality, habits closely associated with the Rule of Law.  This 
would be a high price to pay for public policy victories won through the 
courts, even or especially for public policies that require judicial 
imposition because they cannot attract enough public support to prevail 
through the democratic process. 
IV. 
There is ample scope in today’s English-speaking democracies for 
legislating public policy, including policy about property, contract, tort, 
and other areas of private law.  This was not always true.  In past 
centuries, there were common law doctrines that statutes should be 
construed narrowly, especially statutes that derogated from the common 
law.  By means of such doctrines, common law judges could—and frequently 
enough did—fail to give full effect to statutes whose provisions, and 
whose policy goals or tendencies, diverged from common law precedents.34  
But these doctrines, and the judicial practice or judicial chicanery that 
went with them, effectively disappeared in the twentieth century.35  If 
courts indulge in some degree of creative interpretation or misinterpretation 
of statutes today, there is no reason to believe it is with a tilt toward 
traditional common law values or policies.  If anything, as courts become 
habituated to broad construction of treaty, constitutional, or statutory public 
law provisions, the style and policy tilt of those public law decisions are 
apt to influence how courts construe private law statutes.  But on the 
whole, legislatures can usually expect the courts to enforce private law 
statutes essentially as written, especially if statutes are drafted clearly. 
What should be the content of private law laid down by the legislature?  
This question merges with the great debates of public policy and political 
philosophy.  How much economic freedom should there be?  How much 
government power, exercised in the name of fairness, equality, environmental 
 34. See, e.g., Shaw v. R.R. Co., 101 U.S. 557, 565 (1880); see also Jefferson B. 
Fordham & J. Russell Leach, Interpretation of Statutes in Derogation of the Common 
Law, 3 VAND. L. REV. 438, 450–51 (1950) (citing cases in which courts ignored statutes 
instructing them not to construe statutes narrowly).  See generally Cass R. Sunstein, 
Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405 (1989) (providing 
an overview of modern statutory interpretation methods). 
 35. See Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of 
Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RESERVE L. REV. 179 (1987) (examining 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century legal reasoning). 
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conservation, or otherwise?  At some higher level of theory, does the political 
community have a goal or philosophy, whether utilitarian, deontic, aretaic, 
theological or otherwise, some combination of these, or none of them, 
and what if any are the implications for the law of property, contract, 
tort, and so on? 
In a democracy, these questions are up to the people and are refracted 
through the delights and imperfections of representative government, 
itself beheld with enthusiasm in varying degrees.  Two or more cheers 
for democracy; the worst form of government, except for all the others. 
In practice, legislatures in common law countries do typically try to 
draft private law statutes clearly.  Broad, vague, aspirational private law 
provisions, by contrast, would invite courts to fill in the details, and to 
make the policy choices that the legislature would have evaded.  This 
would have many or all of the drawbacks, suggested above in this 
Article, of a more public law style of private law adjudication.  Worse, 
legislatures and courts might both try to escape public responsibility for 
bad or unpopular decisions by pointing the finger at each other.  In the 
end, dissembling and evasion of responsibility by the legislature would 
only invite dissembling and evasion by the courts as well. 
As for private law adjudication generally, there is no clear boundary 
between the common law style and a more public law style, just as there 
is no clear boundary—at least in common law countries—between 
private law and public law.  The common law process allows for development 
and change, taking public policy into account.  Done aggressively 
enough, such common law adjudication could easily shade over into a 
more public law style of judicial lawmaking.  Likewise, private law and 
public law themselves can be difficult to distinguish.  Many aspects of 
family law, for example, might be characterized either way.36
Yet, there is a difference, in degree if not in kind, between the 
common law style of private law adjudication, and public law.  There are 
distinctive values and principles in the common law bloodstream, a kind 
of modified classical liberalism, in turn associated with both political 
freedom and economic prosperity.  There is the characteristic common law 
deference to precedent, without rigid adhesion to it.  There is the common 
law reluctance to adjudicate public questions that are fundamentally 
 36. Marriage, for example, is a private relationship whose public implications 
emerge dramatically in the debate over gay marriage.  See generally Editor’s Symposium, 
The Meaning of Marriage, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 821 (2005) (providing articles and 
comments on the public and private implications of marriage). 
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contentious.  This common law style of private law has links with what 
are generally thought of as Rule of Law values. 
Private law adjudication might easily be made more public, more overtly 
politicized.  But the drawbacks, in stability, transparency, legitimacy, and 
habits of judicial impartiality would be considerable.  The values that 
would suffer are themselves closely associated with the Rule of Law.  
Corroding the Rule of Law in this way—or in any way—would have ill 
consequences, public as well as private. 
 
